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Abstract
We study consumption behaviour in systems with heterogeneous interacting
agents. Two different models are introduced, respectively with long and short
range interactions among agents. At any time step an agent decides whether
or not to consume a good, doing so if this provides positive utility. Utility
is affected by idiosyncratic preferences and costs as well as externalities from
other agents. Agents are ranked in classes and recognize peer, distinction
and aspiration groups. We simulate the system for different choices of the
parameters and identify different complex patterns: a steady state regime
with a variety of consumption modes of behaviour, and a wave/cycle regime.
The cases of fad and value goods are both analyzed.
Keyword: Heterogeneous interacting agents, waves, social-economics evolution, complex
systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A great body of literature has been devoted to the effects that interactions among con-
sumers or firms (henceforth called agents) have on the macroeconomic variables of social-
economic systems (Aoki 1996). Applications range from consumption theory, economic
growth, opinion formation, stock market prices and emergence of de facto standards in
technology choice (see Kirman (1997) and Durlauf (1997) for recent reviews).
A common feature of many aggregate variables is that they exhibit oscillatory behaviour,
showing boom-and-bust patterns. Examples are fad and bandwagon behaviour in sociology,
business cycles in economics, bubbles in stock market prices, wave behaviour in the adoption
of innovation technology. Boom-and-bust cycles have been observed (Persons et al. 1996)
also in the adoption of financial technologies, like the CMO (collateralized mortgage obliga-
tions) and the LBO (leveraged-buyout) waves of 1980s, the merger and aquisition waves of
the 1890s, 1920s and 1960s as well the takeover wave of the 1980s.
Such oscillatory behaviour can be explained in terms of interacting agents if an in-
dividual’s consumption decision depends on the behaviour of different group of consumers.
Various models have been introduced (Kirman 1996, Durlauf 1996), with interactions among
agents depending on the agents’ “distance” (such as, for example, differences in wealth) but
typically in these models agents interact in a symmetric way with each other.
Recently Cowan, Cowan and and Swan (1998), hereafter (CCS), introduced a model
where the utility of an individual agent can be positively or negatively affected by the
choices of different groups of agents and consumption is driven by peering, imitiation and
distinction effects. In CCS (1998), consumers are ordered according to their social status
and are affected by the behaviour of other agents depending on their relative location on
the spectrum. Agents wish to distinguish themselves from those who are below and emulate
their peers and those who are above in the social spectrum.
Even though this model is capable of reproducing consumption waves, which emerge from
the interplay between aspiration and distinction effects, it lacks an important ingredient,
2
namely costs of consumption.
We reformulate here the model of paper CCS (1998) in the framework of statistical me-
chanics of disordered systems, incorporating costs of consumption which vary across agents
and are exogenously determined. The dynamical properties of the model are explored, by
numerical simulations, for different choices of the parameters. Various complex patterns are
found.
II. MODEL
We consider N agents, ordered on a one-dimensional continuum space according to their
“wealth” wi. In this paper wealth serves as an index of social status rather than the source of
a budget constraint, as discussed below. A more realistic situation with consumers arranged
over a multidimensional space (accounting, for example, for differences in age, education,
etc.) should be considered, but for simplicity we will only discuss here the case d = 1.
Agents’ wealth is chosen randomly, it is uniformly distributed between zero and W0, and
does not change with time.
Time evolves discretely and at each step the state of the agent i is characterezied by a
variable Si which can take only two values ±1; if agent i chooses to consume then Si = 1
while if (s)he chooses not to consume then Si = −1.
At time zero a new product appears in the market and each agent decides whether or not
to consume one indivisible unit of it, doing so if this provides positive utility (for example a
new restaurant opens at time zero and in each subseqent time period agents decide whether
to visit it or not). Utility Yi(t)
1 is affected by idiosyncratic preferences and costs as well as
externalities from other agents:
Yi(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
JijSj(t) +G(wi) + Cci +Nni(t) (1)
1It corresponds to a Hamiltonian interaction: H =
∑N
i=1 Yi(t)Si(t).
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Individual costs, ci are uniformly distributed in the interval (−1, 0) and the functional
form of the intrinsic value G(wi) of the good for different agents will be specified below.
In this partial equilibrium set-up with only one good, the decision on whether to buy the
good or not depends only on whether the “marginal” utility of buying one unit exceeds the
“marginal” cost. In this sense, all agents are assumed to possess sufficient liquidity at all
points of time and wealth constraints are never binding.
A product with G = 0 is called a “fashion” good, while a “status” good has a positive
intrinsic value that might be well-suited to the characteristics or tastes of a particular class
of consumers. The idiosyncratic noise term ni, describes individual preferences which can
change with time, and are random uniformly distributed in the interval (−1, 1).
Each agent interacts with all the others, and the coupling constants Jij are functions of
the agents’ status according to:
Jij = −JA arctan(wi − wj) + JS
[
π
2
− arctan |wi − wj |
]
(2)
The coefficients JA, JS are taken positive. The asymmetric term, proportional to JA, gives
a negative contribution to the utility function Yi if wi > wj and a positive contribution
if wi < wj. This means that agent i wishes to distinguish herself from the poorer while
imitating the richer. The second contribution, proportional to JS, always generates positive
utility and expresses peering effects among consumers of similar status. Both of these
contributions saturate with distance. In Fig. (1.a) Jij is plotted as a function of (wi − wj).
At each time t, we let agents re-evaluate their consumption decision, relative to the
one taken one step before, on the basis of the utility Yi(t) they receive at the same time.
This amounts to assuming that agents are myopic or that they face a complete absence of
opportunities for intertemporal arbitrage, i.e. there are no capital markets. Agents choose
simultaneously, that is, our system evolves with parallel dynamics. We have further allowed
the possibility that only a fraction α of the total population reconsider their decision, with
this subpopulation picked randomly at each time step. In the following though we shall
consider only the case α = 1.
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An alternative scenario that will be considered (which we call Model II henceforth) is
when JS = 0 and the asymmetric influences exercised by agents on the others are given by:
Jij = arctan
JA
wi − wj
(3)
Jij is shown in Fig. (1.b). In this case there are only distinction-aspiration effects, which
are stronger for agents of similar status and vanish at large distance. This describes the
situation where agents segregate in social-economic groups so that among members of the
same group there is a tendency to outshine their peers and to ignore the rest.
In both cases, the coupling constants Jij are random numbers (positive or negative) which
provides an analogy with spin-glass models (Mezard et al. 1987). The peculiar properties
of spin-glasses have attracted considerable attention (Aoki 1996, Arthur et al. 1988, Arthur
et al.1997) in social-economic disciplines, particularly towards the possible implications, in
that context, of the degeneracy of the equilibrium state and of the slow relaxation dynamics
to equilibrium (aging).
We stress though that in our formulation the coupling constants are not symmetric and
we do not expect our model to share the nice properties of spin glasses (Crisanti et al.
1988, Cugliandolo et al. 1997). Nonetheless a study (Iori et al. 1997) on the Sherrington-
Kirkpatrick (SK) model with a non-hamiltonian contribution (i.e. taking Jij = J
S
ij + ǫJ
A
ij )
has shown that both the dynamical behaviour and the nature of equilibrium (at least for
small lattices) survives for a small asymmetric perturbation. In view of this result it could
be interesting to repeat the study of Iori et al. (1997) when ǫ is zero for all but a certain
fraction of the (i, j) pairs, for which pairs, ǫ can be large. This case would be similar to the
model proposed in eq. (1).
Eventually, the case of our model in eq. (1) with JA = 0 (i.e. considering only peering
effects) would be a natural framework to study the problem of technological progress. In
this case, indeed, while peering finds a natural interpretation in terms of the advantage that
interacting firms have (for example those who share a partnership) for being at a similar
technological level (see Arenas et al.(1999), aspiration and distinction effects do not affect
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the payoff a firm receives from adopting a new technology. When JA = 0, eq. (1) describes
a modified Random Field Ising Model (RFIM) with site dependent couplings. At zero
temperature, when adiabatically driven by an external field, the RFIM is characterized by
avalanche dynamics. In our model the role of the external field is played by costs.
III. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
A. Model I
We have performed computer simulations to study the model in eq. (1) above for different
choices of the parameters and explored the various patterns observed. We studied both the
time evolution of total consumption as well as the shape of the distribution of consumption
across the social spectrum.
The pictures we show refer to a relatively small lattice of V = 800 consumers (for the
graphics we are limited by the size of the screen). We analyzed however larger lattices
(V = 4000) and results do not qualitatively change with the lattice size. Agents’ wealth is
uniformly distributed in the interval (0,W0) with W0 = 100 and does not change with time.
We assume that, when a new good enters the market, agents initially do not consume it
(Si(0) = −1). We could have alternatively chosen a nonhomogeneous initial condition (with
consumption distributed across agents with a certain probability) and study how the system
evolves towards the equilibrium state.
Initially we study the case of a fashion good (G = 0), choosing C = N = 0. We explore
the different consumption patterns when fixing JA and increasing JS. For JS small (region
I) the total consumption exhibits waves, with amplitude less than V and high frequency.
As JS is increased the period of oscillations increases and the amplitude becomes almost
equal to V . The situation is depicted in Fig. (2) for JA = 1 and JS = 2, 15, 25. In Fig. (3)
we show a typical pattern, for JA = 1, JS = 25, as a function of time (time increases from
top to bottom). Notice that it is the rich who start consuming first in order to distinguish
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themselves from the poor. At the beginning of each cycle consumption propagates rather
slow but it spreads faster as it moves down to the poorer. As we keep increasing JS though,
the waves disappear and the system develops a steady-state behaviour with a variety of
consumption patterns: above the value JcS where waves disappear, we first find a narrow
region (region II) where all but the richest consume. Still increasing JS we find a region
(region III) where only the rich consume but not the rest, while if we further increase JS
(region IV) nobody consumes as distinction effects are not strong enough to initiate the
process. Simulations for these three regions are shown in Fig. (4). The precise location of
these four regions in the JA, JS region is depicted in Fig. (5) for a 800 lattice.
Up to now we have assumed that agents do not have specific preferences for the new good.
When introducing preferences, these act like the temperature in a physical system and can
induce a transition from an equilibirum state to another. In our model, for example, as we
turn on idiosyncratic noise (N > 0), in region I waves become blurred with consumption
greater than zero and less than V , while for JA = 1, JS = 0, N = 1, Fig. (6), we see curiously
the emergence of modulated waves. Eventually, for values of N > 0, consumption waves
emerge also in region IV (a larger N is required the deeper one is in region IV) where, at
N = 0, nobody would consume.
Next we introduce costs (C > 0) while keeping G = 0 (or small compared to costs).
For cost below a certain value (we find Cc = 0.465 for JA = 1 and JS = 25) waves still
emerge and propagate across all the social spectrum, but if C > Cc the equilibrium state is
characterized by nobody consuming. Adding noise, at N ∼ 1 consumption waves, of varying
amplitude, emerge spontaneously even at C > Cc, though at irregular time intervals (see
Fig. (7)). Nonetheless if Ni becomes much larger, waves disappear and total consumption,
disorderely distributed, fluctuates around a constant level.
Also initial conditions can have an important role on the dynamical selection of the
different asymptotic states: in Fig. (8) we show that imposing an initial condition with a
fraction (here the top 10% of the population) of the agents consuming, then a consumption
wave is generated even for C > Cc.
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Finally we consider the general case of a status good, which has an intrinsic value
(G(wi) > 0) for some agents i and its consumption entails costs (Ci > 0). We consider
the case of a good which is more suitable to this group of consumers whose wealth is dis-
tributed around a given value wm, and we choose:
G(wi) =
G
(wi − wm)2
(4)
The results which follow refer to the case JA = 1, JS = 25, G = 1, N = 0. We fix costs
at a level higher than Cc, estimated before for the case G = 0 (below this value waves
propagate even in the case of a fashion good). Different behaviours are found, depending on
costs and/or wm. For wm < 85, (we remind that agents’ wealth is distributed between zero
and W0 = 100), the good enters the social spectrum around wm, possibly migrates through
the closest social classes and then finds a stable niche (see top three cases in Fig. (9)).
If wm ∼ W0, for costs not too high (but still larger than Cc), waves emerge and spread
throughout the whole social spectrum (bottom case in Fig. (9)).
The effect of adding idiosyncratic preferences is again to induce waves in regions where,
in its absence, consumption would reach a constant level and would be limited to a few
consumers.
B. Model II
In this case, as we said, only aspiration/distinction effects affect the consumption be-
haviour of agents. We will focus only on short range interactions (e. g. choosing JA = 1)
while, for larger values of JA, as can be seen from Fig. (1a)), the potential becomes longer
range.
We will compare Model II with Model I assuming JS = 0. While consumers feel in
both cases (only) distinction and aspiration effects, their strength of interaction changes
differently with distance, becoming zero at large distances for Model II, while it is finite and
non-zero for Model I. Moreover at short distances the potential is large and sharp for model
II while it is almost zero for Model I.
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Starting with C = G = N = 0, both models show oscillations in total cosumption, the
amplituide of which is smaller in Model II compared to Model I (Fig. (10)). Nevertheless
the consumption pattern in the two models is clearly different (Fig. (11)): in Model II there
are no diffusing waves but a more chaotic situation with different social groups consuming
at different times. This effect is better captured by Fig. (12) where we plot the consumption
density at different locations along the social spectrum and at different times. We can see
that consumption as a function of class is multi-peaked. We also found that the period
of oscillations in Model II changes very little with JA despite the fact that the potential
becomes longer-range as JA increases. This is a consequence of the sharp increase of the
potential at short distance, so that the main contribution to the utility function Yi comes,
even at large values of JA, mainly from nearest-agent interactions.
Adding costs, while keeping G = N = 0, generates market segmentation. The larger the
costs are (Fig. (13 (a) and (b) )) the more sparse the consumption becomes. It is interesting
though that even with high costs some agents still choose to consume out of their desire to
distinguish themselves from their peers.
Finally, we study the case of a value good (Fig. (13 (c), (d) and (e))) which would mostly
suit consumers whose wealth is close to a reference level wm. In this case the good finds a
stable niche: those agents who benefit from its consumption continue to consume the good
(inducing possibly fringes to their neighours), but their behaviour does not affect distant
social groups (not even when it is for the richest that the good has an high intrinsic value).
Adding idiosyncratic preferences in all of the above cases only generates occasional ad-
ditional consumption in the patterns above but does not change the asymptotic behaviour
of the system. Let us finally comment that even if we take JA large (in which case the in-
teraction becomes long-range), we do not obtain waves that spread smoothly like in Model
I, and this is due to the absense of peering for nearby consumers.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have focused on a potentially important mechanism that drives consump-
tion decision: the interaction among heterogeneous consumers. In the sociology literature,
interactions among individuals, belonging to similar or different social circles, are often seen
as a major mechanism that determines new styles of behaviour. In model I we studied
how peering, distinction and aspiration effects, together with costs and intrinsic values of
a good, generate different consumption patterns, under the assumption that information
on the consumption behaviour of agents is public (JA and JS are long range and saturate
to a finite value at large distances). However collective behaviour may be affected by the
structure of the communication channels. Models with imperfect information diffusion and
social segregation in the way knowledge is transmitted have been proposed to explain fashion
cycles (Corneo et al. 1994) . We take into account the possible local nature of interactions
in model II where the Jij decay rapidily to zero with social distance.
Both models present different consumption regimes: a dynamical one characterized by
waves and cycles plus a variety of stationary patterns. The two models, though, appear
very different in the way consumption is spatially distributed. Initial conditions combined
with random individual preferences may have a major role in pushing the dynamics of the
system into one of the different asymptotic states.
To conclude we point that it would be interesting to compare patterns of consumptions for
different choices of the distribution of agents’ wealth, such as, for example, a discontinuous
distribution with gaps in the social spectrum or a gaussian distribution centered around a
given social class.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to S. Jafarey for helpful comments. V.K. acknowledges the support of
the General Secretariat of Research and Technology, Greece, under contract 45890. V.K
10
also wishes to thank the University of Essex for the kind hospitality provided during the
initial stages of this work.
REFERENCES
Aoki, M. New approaches to macroeconomic modeling, Cambridge University Press
(1996).
Arenas A., Diaz-Guilera A., Perez C. J. and Vega-Redondo F., “Self-organized evolution
in socio-economics environments”, cond-mat/9905387 (1999).
Arthur W. B., Anderson P.W. ,Arrow K. J. and Pines D., eds., The economy as an evolving
complex system I, Addison-Wesley (1988).
Arthur W.B., Durlauf S.N. and Lane D., eds., The economy as an evolving complex system
II, Redwood City: Addison-Wesley (1997).
Corneo G. and Jeanne O. A Theory of Fashion Based on Segmented Communication, e-
preprint http://netec.wustl.edu/WoPEc/data/Papers/bonbonsfa462.html (1994).
Cowan R., Cowan W. and Swan P., Waves in Consumption with Interdependence among
Consumers,
e-preprint http://netec.wustl.edu/WoPEc/data/Papers/dgrumamer1998011.html (1998).
Crisanti A. and Sompolinsky H., Dynamics of spin systems with randomly asymmetric bonds,
Phys. Rev. A 37 (1988) 4865.
Cugliandolo L.F. et al., Glassy behaviour in disordered systems with non-relaxational dy-
11
namics, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 350 (1997).
Durlauf S., Statistical mechanics approaches to socioeconomic behavior, in The economy
as an evolving complex system II, W.B. Arthur, S.N. Durlauf and D. Lane, eds., Redwood
City: Addison-Wesley (1997).
Iori G. and Marinari E., On the Stability of the Mean-Field Glass Broken Phase under
Non-Hamiltonian Perturbations J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. (1997) 4489-4511.
Kirman, A. Economies with interacting agents, in The economy as an evolving complex
system II, W.B. Arthur, S.N. Durlauf and D. Lane, eds., Redwood City: Addison-Wesley
(1997).
Mezard M. et al., “Spin Glass theory and Beyond”, (World Scientific, Singapore 1987).
Persons J. and Warther V. Boom and Bust Patterns in the Adotpion of Financial Innovations
e-preprint http://netec.wustl.edu/WoPEc/data/Papers/wopohsrfe9601.html (1995).
12
FIGURES
−100 −50 0 50 100
wi − wj
−10
0
10
20
30
40
J ij
JA=1, JS=25
JA=1, JS=0
JA=2, JS=25
−100 −50 0 50 100
wi−wj
−2
−1
0
1
2
J ij
JA=1
JA=10
JA=50
FIG. 1. Jij respectively for Model I (top) and Model II (bottom). Notice that while in Model
I the Jij saturate to a finite value at large distances (long-range interactions), in Model II the Jij
are short range and decay quickly to zero.
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FIG. 2. Total consumption as a function of time in Model I. JA = 1 and three different values
of JS = 5, 15, 25 are considered respectively from top to bottom. Here C = G = N = 0.
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FIG. 3. Wave dynamics in Model I, with the dark color for those agents consuming and
light color for those not consuming. Wealth is increasing from left to right along the hor-
izontal axis. The vertical axis represents time which increases from top to bottom. Here
C = G = N = 0, JA = 1, JS = 25.
FIG. 4. Steady-state behaviour for Model I in region II at JA = 1, JS = 29.4 (top), and region
III at JA = 1, JS = 30.5 (bottom), where C = G = N = 0.
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FIG. 5. Phase diagram in JS − JA space for C = G = N = 0, α = 1.
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FIG. 6. The idiosyncratic noise produces a modulated wave, in the absense of costs, gains and
peering effects, where the amplitude of consumption changes periodically with time.
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FIG. 7. Waves in consumption with JA = 1, JS = 25, C = 1.29, G = 0, N = 0.9 starting from
Si(0) = −1.
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FIG. 8. If an initial condition is imposed that the richest 10% are consuming, and
N = G = 0, C = 1.29, JA = 1, JS = 25 then a wave emerges once. Time is T = 100 steps.
FIG. 9. Consumption behavior when JA = 1, JS = 25, C = 0.5, G = 1, N = 0 and
wm = 10, 50, 80, 85 (from top to bottom). Only when the good is suitable to the consumers
located at the top of the social scale a consumption wave propagates. In all other case the good
enters and finds a stable niche.
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FIG. 10. Total consumption in Model II with C = G = N = 0 and JA = 1 (left). For
comparison we show the total consumption in Model I with JA = 1 and JS = 0 (right).
FIG. 11. Cycles of consumption in Model II with C = G = N = 0 and JA = 1 (top). For
comparison we show the consumption patters in Model I with JA = 1 and JS = 0 (bottom).
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FIG. 12. Plots of the distribution of consumption across agents for Model II at different times
(to be read in rows from top left), for C = G = N = 0 and JA = 1.
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FIG. 13. Consumption behaviour in Model II for (from top to bottom) (a)C = 0.5, G = 0
(b)C = 4, G = 1, wm = 0 (c)C = 4, G = 1, wm = 10 (d)C = 4, G = 1, wm = 50
(e)C = 4, G = 1, wm = 90.
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